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Abstract—Power distribution system cyber-security concerns 
are increasing rapidly with growing demands for open accesses to 
the distribution systems for electricity generation and trading 
imposed by new government deregulations. This paper proposes 
a new integrated network security protocol layer, located below 
the data-link layer of DNP3 – a popular utility protocol, to 
enhance the data transmission cyber-security for power 
distribution systems. The security layer utilizes distribution 
system characteristics to provide comprehensive security while 
maintaining virtually no impact on the existing DNP3 
specification. The proposed security layer provides end-to-end 
security and link security through encryption, authentication, 
and padding operations. ‘Recipe’ formats, with independent 
cipher and authentication, are designed for the security layer 
operations to increase flexibility, coverage and quality of service 
capabilities of the security layer and to provide rapid responses 
for changes in cyber-security threats in the power distribution 
systems. This paper describes its significant applications in 
distribution system stability controls.  
 
Index Terms--Computer networks, Computer network 
management, Computer network security, Power system 
communication, Power system security, Protocols, Security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
YBER-security for the power distribution system is 
becoming a serious concern for power system utilities 
with ongoing power system automation and government-
imposed open access [1]-[3]. The continuing power system 
automation increases the use of intelligent electronic devices 
(IEDs) with communication capabilities for efficient 
distribution system protection, control and monitoring 
operations with connections to external networks. In order to 
process collected data, IEDs require external data from their 
peer IEDs within the same network or through an external 
network. However, increased data access with peer IEDs 
within the same network or through external networks could 
aggravate the opportunities for cyber-hackers to manipulate 
data that may cause IEDs to malfunction or even fail.  
   With open access requirements, access to distribution 
system utility computer networks from external networks, for 
electricity generation and trading transactions, increases the 
number of users who are allowed to access the utility network 
through the Internet where not long ago, only trained utility 
staff had access to the utility network. This has considerably 
aggravated the risks for proper power system operations due 
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to potential cyber-attacks. Under new government open-
access deregulation policies, the number of local independent 
electricity generation sources increases rapidly. The 
connection of small generation capacity sources and dispersed 
generation to the power distribution system, when subjected 
to disturbances, may aggravate considerable stability 
problems [4]. The stability problems may first disturb the 
local utility service supplies, second impact the distribution 
system, and then affect the transmission systems [4]. For this 
reason, numerous IEDs are installed to monitor the 
distribution system operation and transmit operation data to 
the controller of generators to enhance the system stability. 
This also creates a critical need for a power distribution 
system cyber-security implementation. 
Commercial networks using the Internet can implement 
substantial and flexible communication security, such as 
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Internet Protocol Security 
(IPsec), and other network security such as ATM security and 
firewalls [5]-[8]. However, these commercial security 
implementations, with unnecessary functionality for power 
system operations or without considering power system 
characteristics, were not designed effectively for the power 
system computer networks to enhance its security. For 
example, the TLS implements its own fragmentation services 
[5] that would not be necessary for Distributed Network 
Protocol (DNP3), a typical power system computer network 
protocol [2]. The X.509 security certificates contain 
certificate handling protocols and chains of authority [9] that 
would be unnecessary for a utility using its control center as 
the certificate authority (CA). In addition, the commercial 
security does not provide encryption confidentiality for the 
entire frame, i.e. with the IPsec in tunnel mode some of the 
source and destination network information is still in the clear 
[7], which can be intercepted by a cyber-attacker.  
To improve power system computer network security and 
reliability, this paper proposes a new security protocol layer to 
provide cyber-security for data transmissions in power 
distribution system computer networks. The security layer 
presented for DNP3 is located between the physical layer and 
the data-link layer for utility communications. The security 
layer includes end-to-end security and link security with 
encryption, authentication, and padding operations. The end-
to-end security provides cyber-security for data transmissions 
between the data transmission source and data transmission 
destination IEDs, preventing intermediate IEDs and 
transmission links in the data transmission path from 
accessing the user data. The link security provides cyber-
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security between two directly connected IEDs in the data 
transmission path, providing security for all of the transmitted 
data between two nodes, i.e. not only is the user data 
encrypted but all of the data-link layer header data as well, 
with the link security, so that none of the transmitted data is in 
the clear that can be accessed by a cyber-attacker. In addition 
the security layer not only provides flexible operations, 
allowing new security measures to be added into the security 
layer, but also importantly provides quality of service (QoS). 
Therefore, the implemented security for a data transmission is 
based upon the demands of the local environment, i.e. 
minimal security within a small facility LAN.  
An important potential application of the proposed cyber-
security is to provide effective protection data transmission 
for the controller of the generator in distribution system to 
improve the stability of distribution system. 
II.  SECURITY LAYER ARCHITECTURE 
A.  Security Layer Placement 
The security protocol layer proposed in this paper is located 
between the physical layer and the data-link layer for the 
DNP3 protocol stack, shown in Fig. 1. The location of the 
security layer provides several advantages to DNP3 for cyber-
security, including: 
1. The proposed security layer is capable of providing 
confidentiality for the entire data-link layer frame, both the 
header data and the user data, which is not typically 
possible with commercial networks. 
2. The proposed security layer consolidates security 
operations into a single protocol layer minimizing protocol 
overhead and redundant operations. For example, in order 
for the Internet to achieve the same security coverage as the 
security layer, the TLS would be used for the end-to-end 
security between the source and destination computer 
nodes. The TLS would then be used over the IPsec in tunnel 
mode to provide security between the source and 
destination networks. Security at the network level, such as 
ATM security, would be used to provide security for data 
transmissions through the networks on the link basis.  
3. The proposed security layer virtually has no impact on the 
DNP3 specification since it does not require alterations to 
the existing specified protocol stack. 
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Data-Link Layer
Security Layer
Physical Layer
 
Fig. 1. DNP3 protocol layer stack with the proposed security layer 
Due to the position of the proposed security layer, the 
entire protocol stack specified by DNP3 is above the security 
layer. Therefore, the security layer can rely on the upper 
layers to perform all of the error control and fragmentation 
operations that a typical security protocol has to handle. This 
security layer is designed for DNP3, allowing the security 
layer to use the DNP3 protocol stack for data transmissions 
by the security layer. This simplifies the proposed security 
layer since it does not implement its own transmission 
protocols that are required for typical security 
implementations. 
B.  Security Layer Scope 
The security layer proposed in this paper provides end-to-
end security and link security. The end-to-end security offers 
security between the source and the destination IEDs for the 
user data, which would consist of application layer data, 
transport layer data, and the cyclic-redundancy-check (CRC) 
values added into the data blocks by the data-link layer. The 
end-to-end security prevents intermediate IEDs or routers 
between the source and the destination from accessing the 
user data that may have been compromised.  
The link security provides security between two directly 
connected IEDs in the data transmission path. The link 
security is applied to all of the data transmitted by an IED, 
both the frame header and user data, so that there is no data in 
the clear over the data transmission medium. The link security 
is therefore used to prevent a cyber-attacker from reading the 
frame’s header for traffic analysis attacks. In addition, the link 
security is necessary for preventing attacks that are not 
handled by the end-to-end security, i.e. an attacker 
manufacturing DNP3 data-link frames using the data-link 
function codes [10] in an attempt to cause a destination IED 
to operate incorrectly to the reception of a frame, i.e. a 
NACK, or to cause a denial-of-service attack, i.e. sending 
empty data blocks with a confirmed user data function code. 
If a simple master-outstation configuration is used, where 
there are no intermediate computer nodes between the source 
and the destination IEDs, the link security is equivalent to the 
end-to-end-security. This allows the end-to-end security to be 
replaced entirely by the link security. However, if 
concentrators are used or if routing capabilities are used as 
proposed in [11], both end-to-end security and the link 
security are required. 
The security layer does not place restrictions on the types 
of security measures used for a data transmission, for both the 
end-to-end security and the link security operations. The 
security measures used on a data transmission can be any 
combination of encryption ciphers and authentication 
operations. This is similar to TLS and IPsec which are 
algorithm independent, allowing new ciphers and message 
digests to be added into their specifications as necessary 
without altering the underlying security specification [5]-[6]. 
The security measures defined for a data transmission use a 
security profile that is similar to the TLS record [5] or the 
IPsec Security Association (SA) [6]. The security profile is a 
‘recipe’ for the security measures to be applied to a data 
transmission. Unlike with TLS which specifies that HMAC 
message authentication is to be used for all data transmissions 
[5], [12], the security profile allows both the specific type of 
security used for the data transmission and the number of 
security operations to be used for a data transmission to be 
variable including the authentication. The security profile is 
referenced with the security profile number (SPN), defined in 
Section III of this paper, which resembles an IPsec security 
parameter index (SPI) [6]. 
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The proposed security layer also provides the capability to 
limit traffic analysis attacks by using padding in a similar 
fashion as IPsec [6]-[7]. The padding is used to cause all data-
link layer frames to have the same number of octets, which 
would be 292 octets for DNP3. With padding, a cyber-
attacker is unable to determine from the size of the frame if 
the frame contains 0 or more data blocks. The cyber-attacker 
is therefore unable to guess the contents of the user data 
based upon the size of the frame, i.e. link management frames 
would only be 10 octets [10] while certain application 
messages would only be an additional 2 octets [13]. The 
padding option is only available for the link security since 
padding for the end-to-end security may unnecessarily 
consume available network bandwidth.  
C.  Security Levels 
The security layer operations used on a data transmission, 
defined by the security profile and referenced using a SPN, 
depend on the security level required for the data 
transmission. For the link security, the security level used for 
the data transmission depends on the local security 
requirements between the two directly connected IEDs, i.e. 
minimal security for LANs. For the end-to-end security, the 
security level for the data transmission between the source 
and the destination IEDs is dependent on the highest required 
link security level in the transmission path. For example, if 
only one of the links in the transmission path requires high 
security, the end-to-end security must use a high security level 
security profile. In general, the higher the security level the 
more security operations are required for the security profile. 
The security layer defines four security levels: No Security, 
Low Security, Normal Security, and High Security. 
The No Security level does not define any security 
operations for the data. For the link security, this may 
represent LAN links within a facility. For the end-to-end 
security, this may represent peer communication within the 
same LAN. 
Only simple encryption operations are defined for the Low 
Security level, such as DES. The security for this level 
represents data or links that have marginal value to cyber-
attackers by the time the security is broken, i.e. data 
transmissions from a substation IED into the substation’s 
LAN or for link status data-link layer messages. 
The Normal Security level is used for typical power 
distribution system data transmissions and only uses 
symmetric ciphers. The use of the symmetric ciphers, opposed 
to the asymmetric ciphers, minimizes any processing delays 
by the security layer. Message digests and HMAC are not 
allowed for the Normal Security level in order to ensure that 
the data transmission sizes are minimal. For example, the TLS 
truncated HMAC uses 10 octets [14] which would represent a 
data transmission size increase of 3.4% to 100%, where the 
former would represent a full size data-link frame of 292 
octets and the latter the minimum sized data-link frame of 10 
octets. Instead, the authentication requirements are relaxed 
since the data-link layer implements several CRC checks for a 
frame [10] making it difficult for a cyber-attacker to create a 
frame that would decrypt properly with all of the CRC values 
being correct, the data-link function codes being correct, the 
transport layer state and sequence number being correct, and 
the application layer header including the sequence numbers 
being correct. 
The High Security level is used for high-risk areas with 
potential transient or sustained attacks on the power 
distribution system computer networks. For this security level 
symmetric or asymmetric ciphers may be used and message 
authentication may be necessary, either a message digest or 
more likely the HMAC. In addition, padding may be used for 
the link security. 
Since the security levels represent the nominal and the 
transient securities necessary for a particular link or between 
particular source and destination IEDs, multiple SPNs are 
required to be maintained for QoS. For example, if a transient 
cyber-attack occurs on the computer network, it is desirable to 
implement higher security operations immediately without 
having to negotiate the security operations. It is also desirable 
to return to the nominal security level immediately once the 
transient attack condition ends, in order to increase the 
efficiency of the network with decreased processing for the 
security operations. 
III.  SECURITY PROFILES 
A.  Security Profile Records 
The security profiles proposed in this paper are similar to 
TLS records [5] or SAs [6] in that they indicate the security 
operations to be used on the data transmission. However, the 
security profile referenced by the SPN resembles a recipe 
more than a record, as the profile contains zero or more 
security operations to be performed on the data, such as the 
use of multiple symmetric ciphers on the same data 
transmission. The security profile records are common to all 
of the IED applications communicating to the same 
destination IED in order to decrease the number of security 
profiles and security profile maintenance.  
The security profile recipe format for the security layer 
operations may cause psychological intimidation for a cyber-
attacker since the cyber-attacker may have to break several 
encryptions on the data transmission before they can obtain 
the user data. In addition, allowing multiple symmetric 
ciphers on a data transmission can prolong the usefulness of a 
cipher for which a weakness has been detected, i.e. one cipher 
will cover the weakness of another cipher such as using two 
smaller key ciphers that could be broken relatively quickly on 
their own but are more difficult to break when used together.  
The security profile records contain the following 
information: SPN, sequence number, expiration, validity, 
security operation, cipher key, cipher mode, cipher key size, 
and additional parameters. 
SPN provides the reference to the particular security profile 
used for the data transmission. A received data transmission 
contains the SPN in the data transmission security header. 
Sequence number provides the order in which the security 
operations are to be applied to the data transmission, with the 
reception operations performed in the reverse order. For 
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example with a high security level SPN, a symmetric 
encryption may be performed followed by the HMAC. 
Expiration indicates the time at which the SPN is no longer 
valid. The SPN is not deleted immediately after expiration 
since some data transmissions in transit to the destination may 
be using the expired SPN. In this situation, to cut down on 
possible data retransmissions, the SPN is deleted after a 
specific time lapse following the expiration, i.e. based on the 
DNP3 application layer function codes used to determine the 
typical transmission time between a master and an outstation 
[13]. Once the SPN entry has been deleted, a cyber-attacker is 
unable to use a replay attack since the same SPN value would 
either not exist or would represent another security profile 
record which would cause the replay data transmission to be 
interpreted as a corrupted data transmission, and discarded. 
Validity indicates if the SPN is currently valid or not for the 
end-to-end and link security. The SPN entry may be invalid if 
it has expired but has not been deleted yet. In addition, the 
SPN entry may be invalid if it is waiting for activation, which 
is discussed in Section VI of this paper. The state machine for 
the validity of the security profile is shown in Fig. 2. 
Immediate
activation
Synchronized
activation
activation
Delayed
activation
Expired
time lapse
Expired
Received
SPN
Invalid
SPN
Deleted
SPN
Valid SPN
 
Fig. 2. Security profile record state machine. 
Security operation indicates the security operation to be 
performed on the data transmission, such as DES, AES, Idea, 
Blowfish, MD5, SHA-1, HMAC, RSA, padding, etc. 
Cipher key provides the cipher key to be used for the 
encryption operations for the data transmission. For 
symmetric ciphers, this key is used for both the encryption 
and the decryption operations. For the asymmetric ciphers, 
this entry contains the source’s private key with the 
destination’s public key contained in the additional 
parameters entry. For HMAC, this entry contains the master 
secret used for the authentication with the message digests. 
Cipher mode indicates the cipher mode used for the 
symmetric keys, i.e. electronic codebook (ECB), cipher chain 
blocking (CBC), and cipher feedback (CFB). 
Cipher key size indicates the size of the cipher key used for 
the data transmission since some ciphers allow different key 
sizes, i.e. RSA-1024, RSA-512, AES-256, and AES-192. 
Additional parameters contains any other additional 
parameters required for the security profile record, such as the 
destination’s public key for asymmetric ciphers and 
Initialization Vectors (IV) for symmetric ciphers. 
B.  Multiple Security Profiles 
The security levels require multiple SPNs to be created for 
both the end-to-end security operations and the link security 
operations to allow quick transitions between security levels. 
Multiple SPNs per security level are necessary for three 
other factors:  
1. Increased security for subsequent security profile 
exchanges. 
2. Increased lifespan of security profiles. 
3. Increased security for data transmissions. 
For factor 1, with more security profiles being used, a 
cyber-attacker is less capable of mounting a denial-of-service 
attack on the data transmissions containing a security profile 
replacement. If a security profile is lost in transit to an IED, 
there would be a sufficient number of other security profiles 
that can be used so that the data transmissions would not be 
delayed or forced to be transmitted in the clear before the 
replacement security profile is received.  
For factor 2, the usefulness of a security profile is a 
function of both time and the number of data transmissions 
using that profile. The longer the time that a cyber-attacker 
has, the more time they have in which to generate possible 
attacks on the security profile, i.e. generating cipher keys in a 
brute force attack. However, the time factor is not critical 
given that it would take a relatively long time for the cyber-
attacker to obtain the corresponding cipher key and that the 
security profile would be replaced before then, especially if 
the security profile uses multiple ciphers. With traffic analysis 
and cryptanalysis attacks, the more data transmissions using 
the same security profile, the more data the cyber-attacker has 
to create an attack.  
Typically each security profile should be used as few times 
as possible before being replaced. However, due to the first 
factor and the fact that the DNP3 IED may use a slow link 
speed, limited usage of a security profile is not recommended. 
The limited usage of a security profile may increase the 
security risks involved in replacing a security profile and may 
as well consume network resources at the expense of time-
critical data transmissions, such as transmissions of power 
distribution system protection data. If multiple SPNs are used, 
the number of transmissions for which the SPN can be used is 
increased by the factor of the number of SPNs available. This 
provides a longer time before security profiles need to be 
replaced, allowing them to be exchanged at a greater 
discretion in regards to the available network resources, i.e. 
during nominal operations and not during protection events.  
For factor 3, since there is a different security profile for 
each data transmission in both the end-to-end and the link 
security, individual message fragments will use different 
security operations. Therefore, it becomes more difficult for a 
cyber-attacker to correlate message fragments together to 
determine the application message using traffic analysis or 
cryptanalysis. This is in comparison to IPsec, where the entire 
message is encrypted before being fragmented [6], allowing 
the cyber-attacker to piece together the fragments to 
determine the structure of the user data. 
The actual number of security profiles used for the end-to-
end security and the link security operations is dependent on 
the network’s capability to maintain the security profiles. The 
limit for the total number of security profiles for all of the 
security levels for the end-to-end security or the link security 
is 256, reflecting the one octet size of the SPN within the 
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security header discussed in the next section. For the required 
security level, one of the valid security profiles is chosen at 
random for the security operations. 
C.  Security Header 
A security header is required to be appended onto a DNP3 
data-link layer frame in order to convey the necessary security 
information between IEDs for the end-to-end security and for 
the link security, such as the SPNs used for the security 
operations. The security header, as shown in Fig. 3, is placed 
after the start field, since the start field may be used in the 
physical layer as a frame delimiter. The security header, 
except for the link security SPN, is encrypted using the link 
security ciphers. Then the only data that is in the clear 
between directly connected IEDs is the start field and the link 
security SPN.  
E-SPN Pad L-Len E-Len CRC L-Var E-VarL-SPN Option
Fig. 3. A full security header generated by the security layer.  
In Fig. 3, the L-SPN is the link security SPN, Option is the 
security options field, E-SPN is the end-to-end security SPN, 
Pad is the padding options field, L-Len is the link length field 
for the L-Var field, E-Len is the end-to-end length field for 
the E-Var field, CRC is the 16-bit CRC field, L-Var is the link 
variable field, and E-Var is the end-to-end variable field.  
The security header has a variable structure depending on 
the security operations performed on the data transmission. At 
the minimum the security header contains the link security 
SPN, the security options field shown in Fig. 4, and the CRC. 
The minimum-security-header structure represents a special 
case where there are no intermediate IEDs or routers between 
the source and destination IED and therefore the end-to-end 
security is not required. 
E-SPN
Used
Padding
Used
L-Variable
Field Used
E-Variable
Field Used
 
Fig. 4. Security options field of the security header. 
For a typical case, the security options field indicates which 
security operations are used. The E-SPN Used field indicates 
if end-to-end security is used for the data transmission. The 
Padding Used field indicates if the link security has used 
padding on the data transmission. The L-Variable Used field 
indicates if the link length field and the link variable field 
exist. The E-Variable Used field indicates if the end-to-end 
length field and the end-to-end variable field exist. 
In most instances the end-to-end security SPN field will be 
present in the security header, with the link security SPN, the 
security options field, and the CRC. This deals with the 
typical cases where both the end-to-end and the link security 
are used for the data transmission at the Normal Security 
level. This security header will only add an extra of 5 octets to 
the DNP3 frame, which corresponds to a frame size increase 
of between 1.71% and 50% depending on the data-link frame 
size. 
For some high security level cases, padding may be 
required for the data transmission to limit the effectiveness of 
traffic analysis attacks. The padding is randomly located in 
the frame in order to obscure data boundaries, making it more 
difficult for a cyber-attacker to apply cryptanalysis against the 
frame. The padding options field is required to indicate where 
the padding is located after the security header and how much 
padding was used for the frame. 
For high security cases, the message digest and HMACs 
may be used by the security profile that requires the resultant 
values from these operations to be placed into the security 
header. The length fields indicate the sizes of the variable 
field while the variable fields contain the message digest or 
HMAC values. The message digest and HMAC use should be 
limited as much as possible since if the end-to-end security 
and the link security both use a truncated HMAC [12], the 
security header size would be increased by 22 octets. The 
CRC in the security header is not used for the variable fields 
since they are in effect an error checking mechanism similar 
to a CRC. The message authentication for the link security is 
authenticate-then-encrypt, while for the end-to-end security it 
is encrypt-then-authenticate. 
IV.  QUALITY OF SERVICE 
The security levels, proposed in this paper, define one type 
of quality of service (QoS) for the security layer, ensuring that 
data transmissions only use the current minimum amount of 
required security for the data transmission path. However, a 
limited amount of selective QoS security operations can be 
used for data transmissions based on the data-link layer 
function code and the application layer function code 
[10][13].  
Certain function codes used by DNP3 can be used to 
disrupt the power distribution system computer network 
operations, such as through the use of the data-link layer 
function code reset-link states or through the application layer 
function codes dealing with application settings [10][13]. 
These function codes require authentication to ensure that 
they are not manufactured data transmissions, where the 
authentication can be obtained by using a High Security level 
security profile.  
The security layer will apply the high security operations to 
the data transmission if the function code is listed for the QoS 
operations. The data-link layer function codes are determined 
from the data-link header. The application layer function code 
is determined by locating a transport layer header with the 
FIR value set, which indicates a start of a new message 
fragment [15] and therefore an application layer header 
containing the function code. The security layer will continue 
to apply the high security level operations to the frames until 
it locates a frame where the transport layer header FIN bit is 
set, indicating an end of the application layer message 
fragment. 
Further application of QoS, based on the object type field 
[13], could be difficult since this would require parsing 
capabilities on the part of the security layer to locate the 
object type fields within the transport layer fragments. 
V.  INTEROPERABILITY 
The security layer’s capability to be interoperable with 
DNP3 devices not implementing a security layer is critical to 
provide a smooth security layer adoption phase. Simultaneous 
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adoption of the security layer for the DNP3 devices would not 
be practical for a live operating power system. 
DNP3 devices not using the security layer could not 
directly indicate if they use a security layer to the destination 
IED. As a consequence, an indirect approach is used to 
determine if security is used on the data transmission based 
on the data-link header CRC field using the method proposed 
in [16].  
If the security layer has been used for the data 
transmission, the calculated CRC value will not match the 
received value located in the typical location for the header 
CRC field. This is true for a transmission error, causing 
corrupted data to be processed by the security layer. However, 
the SPN, security layer CRC, and all of the DNP3 layers’ 
CRCs, sequence numbers, and states would have to match in 
order for the frame to be accepted by the DNP3 IED that is 
unlikely.  
Before transmitting the encrypted data transmission, the 
security layer must ensure that the encrypted security layer 
does not contain a value that would cause the destination to 
interpret a value from the security layer header as a valid CRC 
value that would incorrectly indicate no security operations. If 
this occurrence is detected in the security layer, another 
security profile is randomly chosen for the data transmission 
in order to remedy this situation. Once the security layer is 
used for a connection, for either the end-to-end or the link 
security, the security layer will expect all data transmissions 
to use the security header, even if the No Security level is 
used. Otherwise, any data transmission that does not use the 
security header and security layer operations will be 
discarded.  
VI.  SECURITY PROFILE MANAGEMENT 
A.  Security Layer Initialization 
One of the difficulties for typical network security, such as 
IPsec and TLS is obtaining the trusted public key of the 
intended recipient that can then be used to create a security 
session between the source and the destination. This difficulty 
results in complex protocols to provide the automated key 
exchanges, such as Internet key exchange (IKE) [17] and the 
Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate 
management protocol [9]. However, the complexity of the 
automated key exchanges and the security certificates can be 
avoided for the security layer if a control center is used as the 
CA and the IED security layers are manually configured.  
With the power system network control center as the CA, 
the security certificates are reduced to the identity of the 
source or destination IED with the source’s or destination’s 
public key that is to be used for the connection. The amount 
of asymmetric cipher information maintained by an IED 
security layer is therefore small, i.e. 258 octets per connection 
for RSA-1024 using the data-link destination address as the 
identity and assuming the source uses a separate private key 
per connection. 
With manual configuration, the security certificates can be 
directly downloaded at the physical site within the distribution 
system into the IED’s memory as well as the security profiles, 
as shown in Fig. 2 for the immediate activation. This entirely 
avoids the risk of the initial downloading of security 
information via the network for the security layer. The 
initialization of the security profiles, and the security 
certificates used to maintain subsequent asymmetric cipher 
security profiles, is performed for all current connections to 
the IED that use the security layer.  
B.  Initialization of New Peer Connection 
When a new peer connection is created for the security 
layer, i.e. due to the adoption of the security layer by the peer 
node or temporary use of a laptop computer for site 
maintenance, the power system network control center acts as 
both the CA and a relay point for the security profile 
initialization between the peers, as shown in Fig. 5. Once the 
peer security profiles have been initialized, the master is 
responsible for the subsequent end-to-end security profile 
maintenance with the outstation. 
Master Outstation
Req.Certificate
Fwd.Certificate
Res.Certificate
Fwd.Certificate
Direct communication
Control Center
 
Fig. 5. Peer security initialization after the security layer has been initialized. 
With the control center performing the CA and relay 
functions, the complexity of the security initialization is 
simplified in comparison to IPsec and TLS. Since all IEDs can 
be expected to have typical communication with the control 
center acting as the CA, the IEDs will be able to use a High 
Security level security profile using asymmetric ciphers to 
convey the security initialization request to the control center. 
The request will include a security certificate containing the 
master’s address and its public key that is to be used by the 
peer IED for the connection. The control center will forward 
the security certificate to the outstation using a High Security 
level security profile that uses asymmetric cryptography. The 
outstation will respond to the security certificate with its own 
security certificate that is to be used for the peer connection 
by sending the certificate to the control center using 
asymmetric cryptography. The control center will forward this 
certificate to the master at which the master will be capable of 
directly communicating with the outstation. 
The security certificate exchange using the control center 
provides several advantages to the security layer and the 
power distribution system. Since the control center is used for 
typical communication, the asymmetric cryptography provides 
authentication and non-repudiation for the security 
initialization between the peers. The control center can 
guarantee the identities of the IEDs to each other. Also there 
is no data that is transmitted in the clear between any of the 
IEDs involved in the peer connection, providing additional 
security to the distribution system data communications. In 
addition, since the control center is used only to relay the 
security certificates, the control center does not have to 
maintain the certificates or revocation lists. The peer IEDs are 
capable of maintaining the connection without the control 
center’s involvement due to the specific public keys used for 
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the connection rather than a single public key for all 
connections.  
C.  Subsequent Security Profile Management 
The security profiles have an expiration given by the 
security profile record that requires periodic replacement of 
the security profiles as they expire and are deleted as shown 
in Fig.2. The master is responsible for the security profile 
replacement operations for itself and for the outstation that it 
is communicating with. Once a security profile has expired, 
the master will generate a replacement security profile which 
has the security operations corresponding to the current 
security level for the end-to-end security or the link security, 
i.e. symmetric ciphers, asymmetric ciphers, authentication, 
and padding. The security layer transmits the security profiles 
using a High Security level security profile, where asymmetric 
ciphers are recommended for greater authentication and non-
repudiation capabilities.  
Since the security profiles are exchanged using a High 
Security level security profile, a mechanism must be 
introduced to detect when a data transmission contains a part 
of the security profile. The security layer is a DNP3 
application in order to minimize its impact on the current 
DNP3 specification. In this situation, the security layer uses 
the DNP3 protocol stack, shown in Fig. 1, to transmit the 
security profiles as data sets. As a consequence, the QoS 
dealing with function codes cannot be used to determine if a 
security profile is being transmitted. Instead, the QoS must be 
extended to the object group number to determine if a security 
profile is being transmitted. This requires application layer 
object group numbers specific to the security layer rather than 
relying on the object group numbers used for the data sets 
[18]. The difficulties of using DNP3 data sets for the security 
profiles include: the data set identifier element values that are 
not static or the same for all IEDs [18], and data set identifier 
element values that would require more parsing capability on 
the part of the security layer to detect a security profile. The 
object group number required for the security profiles have an 
added requirement that there is only a single data set per 
message fragment in order to avoid the need to create parsing 
capabilities to search through the user data for other security 
profile data sets. 
The activation of the security profiles is synchronized so 
that the security profiles become active at the same time at 
both the master and the outstation, which is shown in Fig. 2. 
The synchronized activation of the security profiles is 
possible with the power system since accurate time stamps are 
critical for many applications and therefore the IEDs are 
expected to have accurate means of maintaining time, i.e. 
global positioning system (GPS). With the synchronized 
activation of the security profiles, a potential problem of one 
IED attempting to use a security profile before the other IED 
has activated the security profile is avoided. The synchronized 
activation represents the expected amount of time, based on 
the application layer function codes used for determining 
delays between IEDs [13], before the outstation receives and 
processes the new security profile.  
The transmission of the security profiles requires a minor 
alteration to the application layer specification for data 
retransmission errors. Since the security profiles are 
synchronized, retransmission of a security profile may be 
received at the outstation after it should have been activated. 
Therefore, the DNP3 application layer has to indicate to the 
security layer when a security profile has to be retransmitted 
so that its synchronized activation time can be updated.  
VII.  APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM STABILITY 
   The proposed security protocol layer for DNP3 has 
tremendous application potentials for live power system 
operations, such as a unique application to provide 
comprehensive security of data transmission for distribution 
system stability control. 
Stability concerns increase rapidly with today’s growing 
demands for open access to power systems for electricity 
generation and trading, facilitated by new government 
deregulations. As proposed by the authors previously [4], a 
novel generator control based on step-ahead predictive control 
methodology and state-of-the-art real-time digital signal 
processing (DSP) technology has been proposed to 
significantly improve the stability and operational 
coordination of distribution systems particularly those with 
dispersed generations, open access operations, or weakly 
connections to bulk power systems. However, due to limited 
computational capabilities of general-purpose 
microprocessors, the predictive control method was originally 
proposed only for the Single Machine Infinite Bus (SMIB) 
system. In general, it is fairly difficult to control the 
disturbances and its consequently potential stability problems 
in the power distribution system due to its constantly varying 
loads. The control method designed for the SMIB system 
often experiences difficulties for application in power 
distribution systems. 
With the utilization of the integrated network security 
proposed in this paper, the novel generator stability control 
that was previously proposed by the authors [4] can be 
applied to enhance the stability of power distribution systems. 
For this stability control application, a real-time equivalent 
circuit of the power distribution system has to be created for 
use in the predictive control. For example, in order to use the 
predictive control method to control the generator GEN-1 
shown in Fig.6 that is simplified from the benchmark 
distribution system given in IEEE Std. 399-1997 for 
distribution system studies [19], an equivalent-circuit for the 
power distribution system at the point of connection for the 
generator GEN-1, as shown in Fig.7, has to be obtained 
through the calculation of the equivalent impedance and 
equivalent voltage. 
   In general, it would be difficult to obtain an accurate 
equivalent circuit for a power distribution system because its 
loads often switch on or off. With data collecting devices or 
IEDs installed at the buses to monitor the disturbances caused 
by load changes or faults in the power distribution system, the 
operation data on each bus in the distribution system can be 
transmitted to the controller of the generator to update the 
equivalent circuit impedance and voltage. The cyber-security 
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protocol proposed in this paper can be used to ensure the 
integrity of data transmissions for creation of an equivalent 
circuit for use in the stability control of distribution systems. 
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Fig.6  Simplified one-line diagram for IEEE power system 
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Fig.7  Equivalent circuit for the power distribution system shown in Fig. 6 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Ongoing automation and the open access implementation of 
the power distribution system are increasing cyber-security 
vulnerability of utility computer networks. The security 
protocol layer for DNP3 has been proposed in this paper to 
provide comprehensive security for distribution system 
computer networks. The proposed security protocol layer, 
located below the DNP3 data-link layer, considers the power 
distribution system characteristics and minimizes the impact 
on the DNP3 specifications by limiting its overhead and 
interaction with the currently specified DNP3 protocols.  
The security protocol layer provides flexibility, coverage, 
and quality of service capabilities for security operations on 
data transmissions through the use of the security profile 
recipe format proposed in this paper. Since security profile 
recipe formats provide independent cipher and authentication 
operations, the security layer can adopt new ciphers and 
authentications without specification changes to security 
layer.  
 The security layer provides security operations for control, 
monitoring, and protection data transmissions between the 
source and destination IEDs on an end-to-end security basis 
and a link security basis. It also provides various levels of 
security, with each security level containing multiple security 
profiles of one or more ciphers and zero or more 
authentications. With multiple security levels containing 
multiple security profiles, an IED could switch to a higher 
security state immediately during transient or sustained 
attacks, and then immediately transition back to the nominal 
state after the attack to improve security layer performance. 
Therefore, the proposed security protocol layer for DNP3 can 
provide strong security for the power distribution system data 
transmissions.  
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